Security Architecture - Weaver AI

# Security Architecture - Weaver AI

**Version:** 1.1.0
**Last Updated:** 2025-10-05
**Classification:** Internal

## Table of Contents

1. [Security Overview](#security-overview)
2. [Threat Model](#threat-model)
3. [Security Controls](#security-controls)
4. [Authentication & Authorization](#authentication--authorization)
5. [Data Security](#data-security)
6. [Network Security](#network-security)
7. [Audit & Compliance](#audit--compliance)
8. [Security Testing](#security-testing)
9. [Incident Response](#incident-response)

## Security Overview

### Security Principles

Weaver AI is designed with **defense-in-depth** and **security-by-default** principles:

1. **Zero Trust**: Every request is authenticated and authorized
2. **Least Privilege**: Minimal permissions by default
3. **Fail Secure**: Errors deny access rather than grant it
4. **Audit Everything**: Comprehensive logging for security events
5. **Secure Defaults**: Safe configurations out of the box

### Security Architecture Diagram

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                    External Threat Surface                   │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                            │
                            ↓
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  Layer 1: Transport Security                                │
│  - TLS 1.3 encryption                                       │
│  - Certificate validation                                    │
│  - HSTS enforcement                                         │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                            │
                            ↓
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  Layer 2: Authentication                                     │
│  - JWT token validation (RSA-256)                           │
│  - API key verification (SHA-256)                           │
│  - User context extraction                                  │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                            │
                            ↓
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  Layer 3: Rate Limiting                                      │
│  - Token bucket algorithm                                    │
│  - Per-user quotas (Redis-backed)                           │
│  - Burst protection                                         │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                            │
                            ↓
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  Layer 4: Input Validation                                   │
│  - Pydantic schema validation                               │
│  - SQL injection prevention                                 │
│  - XSS/CSRF protection                                      │
│  - Size limits enforcement                                  │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                            │
                            ↓
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  Layer 5: Authorization (RBAC)                               │
│  - Role-based access control                                │
│  - Capability-based permissions                             │
│  - Tool access enforcement                                  │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                            │
                            ↓
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  Layer 6: Policy Guards                                      │
│  - Content filtering                                         │
│  - Prompt injection detection                               │
│  - URL allowlist/denylist                                   │
│  - PII detection (pre-processing)                           │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                            │
                            ↓
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  Layer 7: Execution Isolation                                │
│  - MCP tool sandboxing                                      │
│  - Resource limits (CPU, memory, time)                      │
│  - Network egress filtering                                 │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                            │
                            ↓
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  Layer 8: Output Sanitization                                │
│  - PII redaction (SSN, credit cards, etc.)                  │
│  - Sensitive data masking                                   │
│  - Response size limits                                     │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                            │
                            ↓
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  Layer 9: Audit Logging                                      │
│  - Structured security event logs                           │
│  - Immutable audit trail                                    │
│  - Compliance reporting (GDPR, SOC2)                        │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                            │
                            ↓
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  Layer 10: Cryptographic Signing (NEW)                       │
│  - RSA-256 signatures for tamper-evident logs               │
│  - SHA-256 event hashing for integrity verification        │
│  - Non-repudiation with cryptographic proof                 │
│  - Compliance: GDPR, SOX, HIPAA, PCI DSS                    │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

## Threat Model

### STRIDE Analysis

#### Spoofing Identity
**Threat**: Attacker impersonates legitimate user to access system.

**Mitigations**:
- JWT signature validation with RSA public key
- API key cryptographic comparison (constant-time)
- Short-lived tokens (1-hour expiry recommended)
- Token rotation and revocation support

#### Tampering with Data
**Threat**: Request/response data modified in transit or at rest.

**Mitigations**:
- TLS 1.3 for all communications
- JWT signature prevents token tampering
- MCP tool calls signed with HMAC-SHA256
- Pydantic validation prevents malformed data

#### Repudiation
**Threat**: User denies performing action.

**Mitigations**:
- Comprehensive audit logging (see `weaver_ai/security/audit.py`)
- **Cryptographically signed audit trails** (RSA-256 signatures)
- **SHA-256 event hashing for integrity verification**
- Immutable log files with append-only mode
- Request/response logging with correlation IDs
- User ID tracked for all actions
- **Non-repudiation through cryptographic proof** (see `weaver_ai/telemetry.py`)

#### Information Disclosure
**Threat**: Sensitive data exposed to unauthorized parties.

**Mitigations**:
- PII redaction enabled by default (`WEAVER_PII_REDACT=true`)
- Secrets stored in environment variables, never in code
- Redis connections secured with password authentication
- Error messages sanitized to avoid leaking internals

#### Denial of Service
**Threat**: System overwhelmed with requests.

**Mitigations**:
- Rate limiting (configurable RPS per user)
- Request size limits (10KB query, 50KB response)
- Timeout enforcement (25s default)
- Connection pooling to prevent resource exhaustion

#### Elevation of Privilege
**Threat**: Attacker gains higher permissions than authorized.

**Mitigations**:
- RBAC enforcement at every tool invocation
- Capability-based permissions (fail-closed)
- Tool approval workflow for sensitive operations
- Least privilege principle in role definitions

### Attack Surface Analysis

| Component | Attack Vector | Risk | Mitigation |
|-----------|---------------|------|------------|
| **API Gateway** | HTTP flood, credential stuffing | High | Rate limiting, auth required |
| **LLM Integration** | Prompt injection, jailbreaking | High | Input guards, output verification |
| **MCP Tools** | Malicious tool execution | High | Sandboxing, approval workflow |
| **Redis** | Unauthorized access | Medium | Password auth, network isolation |
| **Environment Config** | Secret exposure in logs | Medium | Redaction, secure storage |
| **Dependencies** | Vulnerable libraries | Medium | Automated scanning (pip-audit) |

### Trust Boundaries

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  Untrusted Zone: Internet                               │
│  - User browsers                                        │
│  - External applications                                │
│  - Malicious actors                                     │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                       │
                       ↓ TLS, Auth, Rate Limit
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  DMZ: API Gateway                                       │
│  - FastAPI endpoints                                    │
│  - Auth/rate limit enforcement                          │
│  - Input validation                                     │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                       │
                       ↓ Internal network
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  Trusted Zone: Internal Services                        │
│  - Agent orchestrator                                   │
│  - Redis event mesh                                     │
│  - MCP tool registry                                    │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                       │
                       ↓ Controlled egress
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  Semi-Trusted: External APIs                            │
│  - LLM providers (OpenAI, Anthropic)                    │
│  - External tools (web search, databases)               │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

## Security Controls

### Authentication Implementation

#### JWT Authentication (`WEAVER_AUTH_MODE=jwt`)

**Token Format**:
```json
{
  "sub": "[email protected]",
  "roles": ["user"],
  "exp": 1696368000,
  "iat": 1696364400
}
```

**Validation Steps** (see `weaver_ai/security/auth.py:40-60`):
1. Extract token from `Authorization: Bearer <token>` header
2. Verify JWT signature using RSA public key
3. Check expiration time (`exp` claim)
4. Extract user ID from `sub` claim
5. Load user roles from `roles` claim
6. Create `UserContext` object

**Key Management**:
- Private key: Keep secure, never commit to repo
- Public key: Configured via `WEAVER_JWT_PUBLIC_KEY` env var
- Key rotation: Update public key, grace period for old tokens

#### API Key Authentication (`WEAVER_AUTH_MODE=api_key`)

**Validation Steps** (see `weaver_ai/security/auth.py:20-38`):
1. Extract key from `Authorization: Bearer <key>` header
2. Compare against `WEAVER_ALLOWED_API_KEYS` (constant-time comparison)
3. Create `UserContext` with key as user ID
4. Assign default "user" role

**Best Practices**:
- Generate keys with `openssl rand -hex 32`
- Rotate keys quarterly
- Use different keys per environment (dev/staging/prod)

### Authorization (RBAC)

#### Role Definition (`weaver_ai/policies/roles.yaml`)

```yaml
user:
  - tool:python_eval
  - tool:web_search
  - tool:documentation

admin:
  - admin:all
  - tool:*

analyst:
  - tool:web_search
  - tool:documentation
  - tool:database
```

#### Permission Check Flow

```python
# weaver_ai/security/rbac.py:30-50
def check_access(user: UserContext, scope: str, roles_path: Path) -> None:
    roles = load_roles(roles_path)
    user_scopes = get_user_scopes(user, roles)

    # Wildcard support (e.g., "tool:*")
    if scope in user_scopes or f"{scope.split(':')[0]}:*" in user_scopes:
        return

    # Admin override
    if "admin:all" in user_scopes:
        return

    raise PermissionError(f"Access denied for scope: {scope}")
```

#### Tool Permissions (`weaver_ai/policies/tools.yaml`)

```yaml
database_query:
  required_scopes:
    - tool:database
  sensitivity: high
  rate_limit: 30
  requires_approval: true  # Manual approval required

code_execution:
  required_scopes:
    - tool:code_execution
  sensitivity: high
  rate_limit: 10
  requires_approval: true
```

### Rate Limiting

**Algorithm**: Token Bucket (see `weaver_ai/security/ratelimit.py`)

**Configuration**:
- `WEAVER_RATELIMIT_RPS`: Requests per second (default: 5)
- `WEAVER_RATELIMIT_BURST`: Burst capacity (default: 10)

**Implementation**:
```python
# Pseudocode
def enforce(user_id: str, settings: AppSettings) -> None:
    key = f"ratelimit:{user_id}"
    bucket = redis.get(key)

    if bucket is None:
        # Initialize new bucket
        bucket = {"tokens": settings.ratelimit_burst, "last_refill": now()}

    # Refill tokens based on time elapsed
    elapsed = now() - bucket["last_refill"]
    refill = elapsed * settings.ratelimit_rps
    bucket["tokens"] = min(bucket["tokens"] + refill, settings.ratelimit_burst)

    if bucket["tokens"] < 1:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=429, detail="Rate limit exceeded")

    bucket["tokens"] -= 1
    redis.set(key, bucket, ttl=60)
```

### Input Validation

**Pydantic Models** (`weaver_ai/models/api.py`):

```python
class QueryRequest(BaseModel):
    user_id: str = Field(..., min_length=1, max_length=256)
    query: str = Field(..., min_length=1, max_length=10000)

    @field_validator("query")
    def validate_query(cls, v: str) -> str:
        # Prevent null byte injection
        if "\x00" in v:
            raise ValueError("Null bytes not allowed")

        # Prevent control character injection
        control_chars = [chr(i) for i in range(32) if i not in (9, 10, 13)]
        if any(char in v for char in control_chars):
            raise ValueError("Control characters not allowed")

        return v
```

**Policy Guards** (`weaver_ai/security/policy.py`):

```python
def input_guard(query: str, policies: dict) -> None:
    # Blocked content filtering
    blocked_patterns = policies.get("blocked_content", [])
    for pattern in blocked_patterns:
        if re.search(pattern, query, re.IGNORECASE):
            raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Query contains blocked content")

    # URL filtering
    urls = extract_urls(query)
    for url in urls:
        if not is_allowed_url(url, policies):
            raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"URL not allowed: {url}")
```

### Output Sanitization

**PII Redaction** (`weaver_ai/security/policy.py:80-120`):

**Patterns Detected**:
- SSN: `\d{3}-\d{2}-\d{4}`
- Credit card: `\d{4}[\s-]?\d{4}[\s-]?\d{4}[\s-]?\d{4}`
- Email: `[a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]+@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\.[a-zA-Z]{2,}`
- Phone: `\(\d{3}\)\s?\d{3}-\d{4}`

**Redaction**:
```python
def output_guard(text: str, policies: dict, redact: bool) -> GuardResult:
    if not redact:
        return GuardResult(text=text, redacted=False)

    redacted_text = text
    redacted_text = re.sub(r'\d{3}-\d{2}-\d{4}', '[SSN-REDACTED]', redacted_text)
    redacted_text = re.sub(r'\d{4}[\s-]?\d{4}[\s-]?\d{4}[\s-]?\d{4}', '[CARD-REDACTED]', redacted_text)
    # ... more patterns

    return GuardResult(text=redacted_text, redacted=True)
```

## Data Security

### Data Classification

| Data Type | Classification | Encryption | Retention |
|-----------|----------------|------------|-----------|
| API Keys | Secret | Env vars only | Rotate quarterly |
| User queries | Confidential | TLS in transit | 30 days (audit logs) |
| LLM responses | Confidential | TLS in transit | 30 days (audit logs) |
| Agent memory | Confidential | Redis AUTH | Session-based |
| Audit logs | Confidential | File system permissions | 1 year |
| Metrics | Internal | TLS in transit | 90 days |

### Encryption

**In Transit**:
- TLS 1.3 for all HTTP connections
- Redis AUTH for Redis connections (password-protected)
- HTTPS required for external API calls

**At Rest**:
- Environment variables for secrets (not in code)
- Redis persistence encrypted at volume level (K8s)
- Audit logs with filesystem permissions (600)

### Secret Management

**Development**:
```bash
# .env file (gitignored)
WEAVER_MODEL_API_KEY=sk-proj-xxx
WEAVER_ALLOWED_API_KEYS=dev-key-1,dev-key-2
WEAVER_JWT_PUBLIC_KEY="-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\n..."
```

**Production**:
```bash
# Kubernetes Secret
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
  name: weaver-secrets
type: Opaque
data:
  model-api-key: <base64-encoded>
  jwt-public-key: <base64-encoded>
```

**Best Practices**:
- Use AWS Secrets Manager, HashiCorp Vault, or K8s Secrets
- Never commit secrets to version control
- Rotate secrets regularly
- Use different secrets per environment

## Network Security

### Firewall Rules

```
# Ingress
Allow: 443/tcp (HTTPS) from 0.0.0.0/0
Allow: 8000/tcp (HTTP) from internal load balancer
Deny: All other inbound

# Egress
Allow: 443/tcp (HTTPS) to LLM providers
Allow: 6379/tcp (Redis) to internal Redis cluster
Allow: 4317/tcp (OTLP) to telemetry collector
Deny: All other outbound
```

### Network Segmentation

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  Public Internet (Untrusted)                    │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                    │
                    ↓ Firewall, TLS
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  DMZ: Load Balancer + WAF                       │
│  - TLS termination                              │
│  - DDoS protection                              │
│  - IP filtering                                 │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                    │
                    ↓ Internal network
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  Application Tier: Weaver AI Pods               │
│  - No direct internet access                    │
│  - Outbound via NAT gateway                     │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                    │
                    ↓ Private subnet
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  Data Tier: Redis Cluster                       │
│  - No internet access                           │
│  - VPC-only access                              │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

## Audit & Compliance

### Audit Logging

**Events Logged** (`weaver_ai/security/audit.py`):
- Authentication attempts (success/failure)
- Authorization failures
- Rate limit violations
- Query requests (user_id, query hash, timestamp)
- Tool executions (tool name, user, result)
- Policy violations (blocked content, disallowed URLs)
- Admin actions (policy changes, user management)

**Log Format**:
```json
{
  "timestamp": "2025-10-03T10:30:45.123Z",
  "event_type": "auth_failure",
  "user_id": "[email protected]",
  "ip_address": "203.0.113.42",
  "details": {
    "reason": "invalid_token",
    "token_expiry": "2025-10-03T09:00:00Z"
  },
  "correlation_id": "req-abc123"
}
```

**Log Storage**:
- File: `WEAVER_AUDIT_PATH` (default: `./audit.log`)
- Rotation: Daily, keep 365 days
- Permissions: 600 (owner read/write only)
- Immutable: Append-only mode

### Signed Telemetry (Tamper-Evident Audit Trails)

**Purpose**: Provide cryptographic proof that audit events have not been tampered with, enabling non-repudiation and compliance.

**Implementation** (`weaver_ai/telemetry.py`):

```python
class SignedEvent(BaseModel):
    timestamp: str                 # ISO 8601 timestamp
    event_type: str                # e.g., "auth_failure", "policy_violation"
    data: dict[str, Any]           # Event-specific data
    signature: str                 # RSA-256 JWT signature
    event_hash: str                # SHA-256 hash of event data

def log_security_event(
    event_type: str,
    signing_key: str | None,
    **event_data
) -> SignedEvent | None:
    """Log security event with optional cryptographic signing."""
    # 1. Compute SHA-256 hash of event data
    event_hash = hashlib.sha256(
        json.dumps(event_data, sort_keys=True).encode()
    ).hexdigest()

    # 2. Create signed payload
    payload = {
        "timestamp": datetime.now(UTC).isoformat(),
        "event_type": event_type,
        "event_hash": event_hash
    }

    # 3. Sign with RSA private key
    if signing_key:
        signature = jwt.encode(payload, signing_key, algorithm="RS256")
        return SignedEvent(
            timestamp=payload["timestamp"],
            event_type=event_type,
            data=event_data,
            signature=signature,
            event_hash=event_hash
        )
```

**Verification** (`weaver_ai/telemetry.py:verify_event_signature`):

```python
def verify_event_signature(event: SignedEvent, public_key: str) -> bool:
    """Verify cryptographic signature of signed event."""
    try:
        # 1. Decode JWT signature with RSA public key
        payload = jwt.decode(
            event.signature,
            public_key,
            algorithms=["RS256"]
        )

        # 2. Verify timestamp matches
        if payload["timestamp"] != event.timestamp:
            return False

        # 3. Verify event type matches
        if payload["event_type"] != event.event_type:
            return False

        # 4. Recompute hash from data
        computed_hash = hashlib.sha256(
            json.dumps(event.data, sort_keys=True).encode()
        ).hexdigest()

        # 5. Verify hash matches
        if computed_hash != payload["event_hash"]:
            return False

        return True
    except Exception:
        return False
```

**Configuration**:

```bash
# Enable signed telemetry
WEAVER_TELEMETRY_SIGNING_ENABLED=true

# RSA private key for signing (PEM format)
WEAVER_TELEMETRY_SIGNING_KEY="<your-rsa-private-key-pem>"

# RSA public key for verification (PEM format)
WEAVER_TELEMETRY_VERIFICATION_KEY="<your-rsa-public-key-pem>"
```

**Key Generation**:

```bash
# Generate 2048-bit RSA key pair
openssl genrsa -out signing_key.pem 2048
openssl rsa -in signing_key.pem -pubout -out verify_key.pem

# Use in environment
export WEAVER_TELEMETRY_SIGNING_KEY="$(cat signing_key.pem)"
export WEAVER_TELEMETRY_VERIFICATION_KEY="$(cat verify_key.pem)"
```

**Security Properties**:

1. **Non-Repudiation**: Users cannot deny performing logged actions
   - RSA-256 signature binds event to private key holder
   - Only entity with private key can create valid signatures

2. **Tamper-Evidence**: Any modification breaks signature
   - SHA-256 hash ensures data integrity
   - Invalid signatures detected during verification

3. **Authenticity**: Events verifiable to originate from legitimate source
   - Public key verification confirms signature validity
   - Prevents forged events from appearing legitimate

4. **Integrity**: Event data hashing prevents undetected modifications
   - Canonical JSON ensures consistent hashing
   - Timestamp included in signed payload

**Performance Characteristics**:

- Signing: ~80ms per event (RSA-256)
- Verification: ~20ms per event
- Storage overhead: ~564 bytes per event (signature + hash)

**Compliance Benefits**:

| Standard | Requirement | How Signed Telemetry Helps |
|----------|-------------|---------------------------|
| **GDPR Article 32** | Integrity and confidentiality of processing | Tamper-evident logs prove data integrity |
| **SOX Section 404** | Internal controls effectiveness | Cryptographic proof of audit trail integrity |
| **HIPAA §164.312(b)** | Audit controls with integrity verification | Signed events prevent unauthorized alteration |
| **PCI DSS Req 10.5** | Secure audit trail storage | File integrity monitoring via signatures |

**Best Practices**:

1. **Key Management**
   - Store private keys in secure vault (AWS Secrets Manager, HashiCorp Vault)
   - Never commit keys to version control
   - Use different keys per environment (dev/staging/prod)
   - Rotate keys quarterly with grace period for verification

2. **Selective Signing**
   - Sign security-critical events: auth failures, privilege escalations, policy violations
   - Don't sign high-volume non-critical events (debug logs, metrics)
   - Balance security with performance

3. **Verification**
   - Verify signatures during security investigations
   - Implement automated integrity checks
   - Alert on signature verification failures

### Compliance Support

**GDPR**:
- Right to erasure: Delete user data on request
- Right to access: Export user's audit logs
- Data minimization: Collect only necessary data
- PII redaction: Automatic in responses

**SOC 2 Type II**:
- Access controls: RBAC implementation
- Audit trails: Comprehensive logging
- Encryption: TLS for transit, at-rest for secrets
- Change management: Version control, ADRs

**HIPAA** (if applicable):
- PHI protection: PII redaction covers PHI
- Access logs: All data access logged
- Encryption: TLS 1.3 in transit
- Integrity controls: JWT signatures, hash verification

## Security Testing

### Automated Security Scanning

**Pre-commit Hooks**:
```yaml
# .pre-commit-config.yaml
repos:
  - repo: local
    hooks:
      - id: bandit
        name: Bandit Security Scan
        entry: bandit -r weaver_ai/
        language: system

      - id: pip-audit
        name: Dependency Vulnerability Scan
        entry: pip-audit
        language: system
```

**CI/CD Pipeline** (`.github/workflows/security.yml`):
```yaml
- name: Security Scan
  run: |
    pip install bandit pip-audit safety
    bandit -r weaver_ai/ -f json -o bandit-report.json
    pip-audit --format json -o pip-audit-report.json
    safety check --json > safety-report.json
```

### Penetration Testing

**Test Scenarios** (see `docs/PENTEST_SUMMARY.md`):
1. Authentication bypass attempts
2. SQL injection in query parameters
3. XSS attacks in responses
4. CSRF token validation
5. Rate limit bypass
6. JWT token manipulation
7. Privilege escalation attempts
8. PII exposure in logs

**Tools Used**:
- OWASP ZAP for automated scanning
- Burp Suite for manual testing
- Custom scripts for API testing

### Security Review Checklist

Before deployment:
- [ ] All endpoints require authentication
- [ ] Rate limiting configured and tested
- [ ] PII redaction enabled
- [ ] Audit logging verified
- [ ] Secrets stored securely (not in code)
- [ ] TLS certificates valid
- [ ] Dependency vulnerabilities scanned
- [ ] Security tests passing
- [ ] Penetration test completed
- [ ] Incident response plan documented

## Incident Response

### Incident Classification

| Severity | Definition | Response Time |
|----------|-----------|---------------|
| **Critical** | Data breach, system compromise | Immediate |
| **High** | Auth bypass, privilege escalation | 1 hour |
| **Medium** | Rate limit bypass, policy violation | 4 hours |
| **Low** | Failed login attempts, suspicious activity | 24 hours |

### Response Procedure

1. **Detection**
   - Automated alerts from audit logs
   - Monitoring system anomalies
   - User reports

2. **Containment**
   - Revoke compromised tokens/keys
   - Block malicious IPs
   - Isolate affected services

3. **Eradication**
   - Patch vulnerabilities
   - Update security policies
   - Rotate credentials

4. **Recovery**
   - Restore from backups if needed
   - Re-enable services
   - Monitor for recurrence

5. **Post-Incident**
   - Root cause analysis
   - Update documentation
   - Improve monitoring
   - Security training

### Contacts

- **Security Team**: [email protected]
- **On-Call Engineer**: Check PagerDuty rotation
- **Compliance Officer**: [email protected]

## Security Roadmap

### Planned Enhancements

1. **Q4 2025**
   - Multi-factor authentication (MFA)
   - OAuth 2.0 support
   - Enhanced prompt injection detection

2. **Q1 2026**
   - Zero-trust network architecture
   - Hardware security module (HSM) for key storage
   - Real-time security analytics dashboard

3. **Q2 2026**
   - Bug bounty program
   - Third-party security certification
   - Automated compliance reporting

## References

- [OWASP Top 10](https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/)
- [NIST Cybersecurity Framework](https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework)
- [CIS Controls](https://www.cisecurity.org/controls)
- [GDPR Compliance Guide](https://gdpr.eu/)
- Internal: `docs/PENTEST_SUMMARY.md`