
If you use Cursor and had the Claude Code extension installed on 29 October 2026, there is a real...
If you use Cursor and had the Claude Code extension installed on 29 October 2026, there is a real chance you ran a backdoored copy of it. Headlines have described this as "Anthropic hacked", and that is not what the vendor reports say. This post separates what has been confirmed from what has been claimed, and gives you a short, practical checklist.
The short version: a modified build of the extension sat in Cursor's extension marketplace for about 11 hours. It tried to give an attacker SSH access to the developer's machine. Cursor says Anthropic did not publish it and that its product was not vulnerable.
These points come from Cursor's own notices, with Sophos and other security vendors repeating them:
Anthropic.claude-code 2.1.312 and 2.1.313, on Windows and macOS, from the Cursor VS Code extension marketplace. Cursor's first notice named 2.1.313; it was updated on 30 October to include 2.1.312.Based on Cursor's incident update (13 November), no. Cursor says an attacker used a credential taken from Cursor's own internal data to place unauthorized copies of the extension on the cache that serves its marketplace. It says Anthropic did not publish this copy, this was not a vulnerability in Anthropic's product, and the upstream source, Open VSX, never had the malware.
The same update describes how the attacker got that credential: an access key Cursor had issued to a third-party inference provider, Fireworks, which Cursor says was exposed by Fireworks. The attacker used it to copy data from a read-only storage bucket, and some stored traces contained unredacted credentials. I have only Cursor's account of this chain. Treat it as the vendor's statement, not independent confirmation.
I could not open the Doublepulsar article that prompted this post, so I can't say how it frames the incident. If you have read it, compare its claims against Cursor's notices linked at the end.
According to Cursor, it:
Note the word "tries". Sophos, citing an analysis by Phorion, says coding errors made SSH enablement fail on most macOS and Windows hosts. That limits the damage on many machines, but it is not a reason to skip the checks. Environment variable names alone can tell an attacker what cloud providers and services you use.
Cursor says the attacker's server has been taken offline. That means blocking the IP is of limited use now, but its logs and your own are still useful for working out whether a machine connected.
svc-telemetry. On macOS or Linux:grep -n 'svc-telemetry' ~/.ssh/authorized_keys No output (or "No such file") means that key is not there. A matching line means the key was added.remediate-macos.sh and remediate-windows.ps1) and the full list of indicators. Use those rather than a checklist copied from a blog, including this one, because indicators were updated after the first notice.On Windows, Cursor gives an equivalent PowerShell check for the user's and ProgramData's authorized_keys files. Get it from the notice itself.
Cursor's advice, in order of priority:
.env files.If you have no sign of the key and no sign of the persistence entries, a precautionary rotation of the most sensitive credentials is still cheap compared with the alternative.
These are my recommendations, not findings from the incident:
authorized_keys. A new key you didn't add is a high-signal alert on any machine, and it is simple to monitor.The notices I read describe the Cursor marketplace copy only. Cursor says there is no evidence that other versions of the extension or the official distribution are affected. I did not test any of this.
Cursor describes an attempt to add an SSH key and open a reverse tunnel, which would give an attacker remote access if it worked. I haven't seen the term "remote access trojan" in the vendor notices I read, so I use their wording.
Follow Cursor's current notice. One third-party advisory I read mentioned 2.1.314 as the fixed version, but I couldn't verify that, and updating alone does not remove anything already planted.
Originally published on DEV Talk.
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