ImageNet classification with deep convolutional neural networks
Alex Krizhevsky, Ilya Sutskever et al.
17
Citations
1
Influential Citations
arXiv.org
Venue
2025
Year
Large language models (LLMs) solve complex problems yet fail on simpler variants, suggesting they achieve correct outputs through mechanisms fundamentally different from human reasoning. To understand this gap, we synthesize cognitive science research into a taxonomy of 28 cognitive elements spanning reasoning invariants, meta-cognitive controls, representations for organizing reasoning&knowledge, and transformation operations. We introduce a fine-grained evaluation framework and conduct the first large-scale empirical analysis of 192K traces from 18 models across text, vision, and audio, complemented by 54 human think-aloud traces, which we make publicly available. We find that models under-utilize cognitive elements correlated with success, narrowing to rigid sequential processing on ill-structured problems where diverse representations and meta-cognitive monitoring are critical. Human traces show more abstraction and conceptual processing, while models default to surface-level enumeration. Meta-analysis of 1.6K LLM reasoning papers reveals the research community concentrates on easily quantifiable elements (sequential organization: 55%, decomposition: 60%) but neglecting meta-cognitive controls (self-awareness: 16%) that correlate with success. Models possess behavioral repertoires associated with success but fail to deploy them spontaneously. Leveraging these patterns, we develop test-time reasoning guidance that automatically scaffold successful structures, improving performance by up to 66.7% on complex problems. By establishing a shared vocabulary between cognitive science and LLM research, our framework enables systematic diagnosis of reasoning failures and principled development of models that reason through robust cognitive mechanisms rather than spurious shortcuts, while providing tools to test theories of human cognition at scale.
This paper addresses a critical gap in LLM reasoning: models often solve complex problems but fail on simpler variants, suggesting their reasoning mechanisms differ fundamentally from humans. By synthesizing cognitive science into a structured taxonomy of 28 cognitive elements, the authors provide a principled framework to diagnose why models fail and how to improve them. The large-scale empirical analysis across 192K traces from 18 models and three modalities (text, vision, audio) is unprecedented, offering a comprehensive view of model behavior. The inclusion of 54 human think-aloud traces further grounds the analysis in human cognition, revealing that models default to surface-level enumeration while humans use abstraction and conceptual processing.
The meta-analysis of 1.6K LLM reasoning papers highlights a critical blind spot: the research community focuses on easily quantifiable elements like sequential organization (55%) and decomposition (60%) while neglecting meta-cognitive controls like self-awareness (16%), which correlate with success. This finding has immediate implications for guiding future research toward more effective reasoning strategies. The development of test-time reasoning guidance that improves performance by up to 66.7% demonstrates practical value, showing that models possess the behavioral repertoires for success but fail to deploy them spontaneously.
The empirical analysis shows that models under-utilize cognitive elements correlated with success, narrowing to rigid sequential processing on ill-structured problems where diverse representations and meta-cognitive monitoring are critical. Human traces exhibit more abstraction and conceptual processing, while models default to surface-level enumeration. The meta-analysis of 1.6K papers confirms that the community neglects meta-cognitive controls that correlate with success. The test-time reasoning guidance achieves up to 66.7% improvement on complex problems, demonstrating that models can be guided to deploy the cognitive elements they already possess.
This work bridges cognitive science and LLM research by establishing a shared vocabulary and framework for diagnosing reasoning failures. It provides tools to test theories of human cognition at scale and offers a principled path toward developing models that reason through robust cognitive mechanisms rather than spurious shortcuts. The practical improvement from test-time guidance shows immediate applicability, while the meta-analysis guides future research priorities. This framework could fundamentally change how we evaluate and improve reasoning in AI systems.
Alex Krizhevsky, Ilya Sutskever et al.
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