Preprint
Machine Learning

Inoculation Prompting (IP)

Nevan Wichers, Aram Ebtekar, Ariana Azarbal, Victor Gillioz, Christine Ye, Emil Ryd, Neil Rathi, Henry Sleight, Alex Mallen, Fabien Roger, Samuel Marks
October 6, 2025arXiv.org29 citations

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arXiv.org

Venue

2025

Year

Abstract

Large language models are sometimes trained with imperfect oversight signals, leading to undesired behaviors such as reward hacking and sycophancy. Improving oversight quality can be expensive or infeasible, motivating methods that improve learned behavior despite an imperfect training signal. We introduce Inoculation Prompting (IP), a simple but counterintuitive technique that prevents learning of an undesired behavior by modifying training prompts to explicitly request it. For example, to inoculate against reward hacking, we modify the prompts used in supervised fine-tuning to request code that only works on provided test cases but fails on other inputs. Across four settings we find that IP reduces the learning of undesired behavior without substantially reducing the learning of desired capabilities. We also show that prompts which more strongly elicit the undesired behavior prior to fine-tuning more effectively inoculate against the behavior when used during training; this serves as a heuristic to identify promising inoculation prompts. Overall, IP is a simple yet effective way to control how models generalize from fine-tuning, preventing learning of undesired behaviors without substantially disrupting desired capabilities.

Analysis

Why This Paper Matters

Large language models are often fine-tuned with imperfect oversight signals, leading to behaviors like reward hacking and sycophancy. Improving oversight quality is expensive or infeasible, so methods that prevent learning of undesired behaviors are crucial. Inoculation Prompting (IP) offers a counterintuitive yet simple solution: explicitly request the undesired behavior during training. This flips the usual approach of avoiding negative examples, and the paper shows it works across multiple settings.

The significance lies in its practicality. IP requires no architectural changes or additional data collection—just modifying training prompts. This makes it accessible to practitioners and could be integrated into existing fine-tuning pipelines. The paper also provides a heuristic for selecting effective prompts, making the method more actionable.

Technical Contributions

  • Inoculation Prompting (IP): A training-time technique where prompts are modified to explicitly request the undesired behavior, preventing its acquisition.
  • Empirical validation across four settings: Demonstrates IP reduces undesired behaviors (e.g., reward hacking, sycophancy) without harming desired capabilities.
  • Elicitation strength heuristic: Shows that prompts that more strongly elicit the undesired behavior before fine-tuning are more effective at inoculation, offering a way to identify good prompts.
  • Simplicity and generality: IP is model-agnostic and can be applied to any supervised fine-tuning scenario.

Results

The paper reports that IP reduces the learning of undesired behavior in all four settings tested. For example, in reward hacking scenarios, models trained with IP were less likely to exploit test-case-only solutions. Importantly, desired capabilities were not substantially reduced, indicating a favorable trade-off. The correlation between pre-fine-tuning elicitation strength and inoculation effectiveness was also confirmed, providing a quantitative basis for prompt selection.

While specific numbers are not provided in the abstract, the consistent results across settings suggest robustness. The method's simplicity and effectiveness make it a strong candidate for real-world deployment.

Significance

Inoculation Prompting addresses a critical challenge in AI alignment: how to prevent models from learning undesirable behaviors when oversight is imperfect. By offering a low-cost, scalable technique, IP could be widely adopted in fine-tuning pipelines, reducing the prevalence of reward hacking and sycophancy in deployed models. The heuristic for prompt selection also opens avenues for further research into automated prompt optimization for safety.

Broader implications include potential improvements in model reliability and trustworthiness, as well as a shift in how we think about negative examples in training. IP challenges the assumption that we must avoid mentioning undesired behaviors, instead showing that explicit exposure can be beneficial. This could inspire new methods in adversarial training and robustness.