Multi-agent sandbox and tool restrictions

Each agent in a multi-agent setup can override the global sandbox and tool policy. This page covers per-agent configuration, precedence rules, and examples.

Sandboxing, Backends and modes, full sandbox reference.
Sandbox vs tool policy vs elevated, Debug "why is this blocked?"
Elevated mode, Elevated exec for trusted senders.

Warning

Auth is scoped by agent: each agent has its own agentDir auth store in ~/.openclaw/agents/<agentId>/agent/openclaw-agent.sqlite. Never reuse agentDir across agents. Agents can read through to the default/main agent's auth profiles when they do not have a local profile, but OAuth refresh tokens are not cloned into secondary agent stores. If you copy credentials manually, copy only portable static api_key or token profiles.

Configuration examples

Example 1: Personal + restricted family agent

{
  "agents": {
    "list": [
      {
        "id": "main",
        "default": true,
        "name": "Personal Assistant",
        "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace",
        "sandbox": { "mode": "off" }
      },
      {
        "id": "family",
        "name": "Family Bot",
        "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace-family",
        "sandbox": {
          "mode": "all",
          "scope": "agent"
        },
        "tools": {
          "allow": ["read", "message"],
          "deny": ["exec", "write", "edit", "apply_patch", "process", "browser"],
          "message": {
            "crossContext": {
              "allowWithinProvider": false,
              "allowAcrossProviders": false
            }
          }
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "bindings": [
    {
      "agentId": "family",
      "match": {
        "provider": "whatsapp",
        "accountId": "*",
        "peer": {
          "kind": "group",
          "id": "120363424282127706@g.us"
        }
      }
    }
  ]
}

Result:

main agent: runs on host, full tool access.
family agent: runs in Docker (one container per agent), only read and current-conversation message sends.

Example 2: Work agent with shared sandbox

{
  "agents": {
    "list": [
      {
        "id": "personal",
        "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace-personal",
        "sandbox": { "mode": "off" }
      },
      {
        "id": "work",
        "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace-work",
        "sandbox": {
          "mode": "all",
          "scope": "shared",
          "workspaceRoot": "/tmp/work-sandboxes"
        },
        "tools": {
          "allow": ["read", "write", "apply_patch", "exec"],
          "deny": ["browser", "gateway", "discord"]
        }
      }
    ]
  }
}

Example 2b: Global coding profile + messaging-only agent

{
  "tools": { "profile": "coding" },
  "agents": {
    "list": [
      {
        "id": "support",
        "tools": { "profile": "messaging", "allow": ["slack"] }
      }
    ]
  }
}

Result:

default agents get coding tools.
support agent is messaging-only (+ Slack tool).

Example 3: Different sandbox modes per agent

{
  "agents": {
    "defaults": {
      "sandbox": {
        "mode": "non-main",
        "scope": "session"
      }
    },
    "list": [
      {
        "id": "main",
        "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace",
        "sandbox": {
          "mode": "off"
        }
      },
      {
        "id": "public",
        "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace-public",
        "sandbox": {
          "mode": "all",
          "scope": "agent"
        },
        "tools": {
          "allow": ["read"],
          "deny": ["exec", "write", "edit", "apply_patch"]
        }
      }
    ]
  }
}

Configuration precedence

When both global (agents.defaults.*) and agent-specific (agents.entries.*.*) configs exist:

Sandbox config

Agent-specific settings override global:

agents.entries.*.sandbox.mode > agents.defaults.sandbox.mode
agents.entries.*.sandbox.scope > agents.defaults.sandbox.scope
agents.entries.*.sandbox.workspaceRoot > agents.defaults.sandbox.workspaceRoot
agents.entries.*.sandbox.workspaceAccess > agents.defaults.sandbox.workspaceAccess
agents.entries.*.sandbox.docker.* > agents.defaults.sandbox.docker.*
agents.entries.*.sandbox.browser.* > agents.defaults.sandbox.browser.*
agents.entries.*.sandbox.prune.* > agents.defaults.sandbox.prune.*

Note

agents.entries.*.sandbox.{docker,browser,prune}.* overrides agents.defaults.sandbox.{docker,browser,prune}.* for that agent (ignored when sandbox scope resolves to "shared").

Tool restrictions

The filtering order is:

Tool profile

tools.profile or agents.entries.*.tools.profile.

Provider tool profile

tools.byProvider[provider].profile or agents.entries.*.tools.byProvider[provider].profile.

Global tool policy

tools.allow / tools.deny.

Provider tool policy

tools.byProvider[provider].allow/deny.

Agent-specific tool policy

agents.entries.*.tools.allow/deny.

Agent provider policy

agents.entries.*.tools.byProvider[provider].allow/deny.

Sandbox tool policy

tools.sandbox.tools or agents.entries.*.tools.sandbox.tools.

Subagent tool policy

tools.subagents.tools, if applicable.

Precedence rules

Each level can further restrict tools, but cannot grant back denied tools from earlier levels.
If agents.entries.*.tools.sandbox.tools is set, it replaces tools.sandbox.tools for that agent.
If agents.entries.*.tools.profile is set, it overrides tools.profile for that agent.
Provider tool keys accept either provider (e.g. google-antigravity) or provider/model (e.g. openai/gpt-5.4).

Empty allowlist behavior

If any explicit allowlist in that chain leaves the run with no callable tools, OpenClaw stops before submitting the prompt to the model. This is intentional: an agent configured with a missing tool such as agents.entries.*.tools.allow: ["query_db"] should fail loudly until the plugin that registers query_db is enabled, not continue as a text-only agent.

Tool policies support group:* shorthands that expand to multiple tools. See Tool groups for the full list.

Per-agent elevated overrides (agents.entries.*.tools.elevated) can further restrict elevated exec for specific agents. See Elevated mode for details.

Migration from single agent

Before (single agent)

{
  "agents": {
    "defaults": {
      "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace",
      "sandbox": {
        "mode": "non-main"
      }
    }
  },
  "tools": {
    "sandbox": {
      "tools": {
        "allow": ["read", "write", "apply_patch", "exec"],
        "deny": []
      }
    }
  }
}

After (multi-agent)

{
  "agents": {
    "list": [
      {
        "id": "main",
        "default": true,
        "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace",
        "sandbox": { "mode": "off" }
      }
    ]
  }
}

Note

Legacy agents.defaults.*/agents.entries.*.* config keys (such as sandbox.perSession, agentRuntime, embeddedPi) are migrated by openclaw doctor; prefer agents.defaults + agents.entries going forward.

Tool restriction examples

Read-only agent

{
  "tools": {
    "allow": ["read"],
    "deny": ["exec", "write", "edit", "apply_patch", "process"]
  }
}

Shell execution with filesystem tools disabled

{
  "tools": {
    "allow": ["read", "exec", "process"],
    "deny": ["write", "edit", "apply_patch", "browser", "gateway"]
  }
}

Warning

This policy disables OpenClaw filesystem tools, but exec is still a shell and can write files wherever the selected host or sandbox filesystem allows. For a read-only agent, deny exec and process, or combine shell access with sandbox filesystem controls such as agents.defaults.sandbox.workspaceAccess: "ro" or "none".

Communication-only

{
  "tools": {
    "sessions": { "visibility": "tree" },
    "allow": ["sessions_list", "sessions_send", "sessions_history", "session_status"],
    "deny": ["exec", "write", "edit", "apply_patch", "read", "browser"]
  }
}

sessions_history in this profile still returns a bounded, sanitized recall view rather than a raw transcript dump. Assistant recall strips thinking tags, <relevant-memories> scaffolding, plain-text tool-call XML payloads (including <tool_call>...</tool_call>, <function_call>...</function_call>, <tool_calls>...</tool_calls>, <function_calls>...</function_calls>, and truncated tool-call blocks), downgraded tool-call scaffolding, leaked ASCII/full-width model control tokens, and malformed MiniMax tool-call XML before redaction/truncation.

Common pitfall: "non-main"

Warning

agents.defaults.sandbox.mode: "non-main" checks the session key against the main session key (always "main"; session.mainKey is not user-configurable, and OpenClaw warns and ignores any other value), not the agent id. Group/channel sessions always get their own keys, so they are treated as non-main and will be sandboxed. If you want an agent to never sandbox, set agents.entries.*.sandbox.mode: "off".

Testing

After configuring multi-agent sandbox and tools:

Check agent resolution

openclaw agents list --bindings

Verify sandbox containers

docker ps --filter "name=openclaw-sbx-"

Test tool restrictions

Send a message requiring restricted tools.
Verify the agent cannot use denied tools.

Monitor logs

openclaw logs --follow | grep -E "routing|sandbox|tools"

Troubleshooting

Agent not sandboxed despite `mode: 'all'`

Check if there's a global agents.defaults.sandbox.mode that overrides it.
Agent-specific config takes precedence, so set agents.entries.*.sandbox.mode: "all".

Tools still available despite deny list

Check the full filtering order: profile → provider profile → global policy → provider policy → agent policy → agent provider policy → sandbox → subagent.
Each level can only further restrict, not grant back.
See Sandbox vs tool policy vs elevated for step-by-step debugging.

Container not isolated per agent

Default scope is "agent" (one container per agent id).
Set scope: "session" for one container per session, or scope: "shared" to reuse one container across agents.

Elevated mode
Multi-agent routing
Sandbox configuration
Sandbox vs tool policy vs elevated, debugging "why is this blocked?"
Sandboxing, full sandbox reference (modes, scopes, backends, images)
Session management